讲座题目：A Responsive Pricing Retailer Sourcing from Competing Suppliers facing Disruptions
主讲嘉宾：Tao Li（李涛）
时 间：2022年9月22日（星期四）上午10：00—12：00
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江南大学商学院
2022年9月20日
主讲嘉宾简介
Tao Li（李涛）is the director of MS Program in Business Analytics and an associate professor of Information Systems & Analytics in the Leavey School of Business at Santa Clara University. He joined the Business School in Fall 2012 as an assistant professor after graduating with his Ph.D. from The University of Texas at Dallas. His research interests include sharing economy, crowdfunding, strategic sourcing, supply chain coordination, operations-marketing interface, sustainable operations management, and behavioral operations management. His scholarship has appeared in leading academic journals such as Production and Operations Management, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, European Journal of Operational Research. His scholarship has been supported by the Santa Clara University Research Grant and the Leavey Research Grant. He is the recipient of the Leavey School of Business Extraordinary Research Award multiple times. He teaches Machine Learning with Python, Data Analytics with Python, and Prescriptive Analytics for MS programs in Business Analytics, Information Systems, and Finance. He also teaches Business Analytics, Predictive Analytics, Computer Based Decision Models, Operations Management, and Analytical Decision Making for the Business School's accelerated and evening MBA program and undergraduate program. He is the recipient of the ACE (Accelerated Cooperative Education Leadership Program) Outstanding Faculty Award in 2016 and 2019, and the Leavey School of Business Extraordinary Teaching Award multiple times. He supervised projects with companies such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Adobe, Rubrik, Cloudera, Nuveen, and Atollogy. He serves as Senior Editor for Production and Operations Management, Associate Editor for Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, and Guest Associate Editor for Naval Research Logistics. He has been a regular reviewer for top journals including Management Science, Operations Research, and Manufacturing & Service Operations Management.
讲座主要内容
Problem definition: We study a problem of a retailer that orders from competing strategic suppliers subject to independent or correlated disruptions and responds by setting the retail price on delivery, called responsive pricing. The suppliers set their wholesale prices in a Nash game. Academic/practical relevance: Supplier disruption correlation exists for reasons such as product and service designs, geographic proximity, and common tier 2 suppliers. In practice, many retailers are able to set the product price after knowing the delivered quantity. Methodology: We model this problem as a Stackelberg-Nash game with the suppliers as the leaders and the retailer as the follower and obtain its equilibrium explicitly. We perform sensitivity analyses with respect to suppliers’ production costs, reliabilities, and their correlation. Results: We find, surprisingly, that an increase in the reliability of a supplier may, counter to our intuition, hurt it because of the competition between the suppliers selling to a responsive-pricing retailer. Furthermore, in contrast to the literature, we find that under responsive pricing, a high disruption correlation may benefit a supplier that has a cost advantage, and the total order quantity may increase in that correlation because of supplier competition. Managerial implications: This paper has important implications for unreliable suppliers because the way reliability and correlation influence their profits depends on the retailer’s pricing power and the competition intensity between the suppliers. With a responsive-pricing retailer, a supplier may not benefit from higher reliability but may benefit from a higher correlation. This suggests that a low-cost supplier serving a responsive-pricing retailer could add to its decision-making tools a new incentive of creating a positively correlated supply network by building plants in the geographic location of its competitor or sourcing from the same tier 2 supplier to obtain an increased correlation strategically.
